政府(语言学)
产权
背景(考古学)
业务
订单(交换)
惩罚(心理学)
过程(计算)
共享经济
面子(社会学概念)
博弈论
营销
产业组织
微观经济学
经济
计算机科学
财务
心理学
古生物学
社会心理学
哲学
语言学
社会科学
社会学
万维网
生物
操作系统
作者
Cui Li,Hong Li,Changqi Tao
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jbusres.2023.113858
摘要
The game process of stable strategies among the government, consumers, and platform enterprises is analyzed by using tripartite evolutionary game theory. The evolution path of platform enterprise, government and consumers is analyzed through numerical simulation by introducing parameters such as the degree of discriminatory pricing, the degree of data property right confirmation, and the intensity of supervision. Results show that the government can improve the market order by strengthening supervision and defining data property rights. When the benefits is higher than the punishment cost, the platform enterprises will choose to discriminatory pricing. But consumers and the media can effectively restrain the discriminatory behavior of platform enterprises by social exposure. In addition, in the face of discriminatory pricing on the platform and lax government supervision, consumers who are vulnerable can only "vote with their feet", and their personal rights and supervision rights are difficult to protected.
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