不可见的
先发优势
可信赖性
独裁者赛局
心理学
社会心理学
认知心理学
计算机科学
经济
营销
业务
计量经济学
作者
James C. Cox,Cary Deck
标识
DOI:10.1002/j.2325-8012.2006.tb00773.x
摘要
This article reports laboratory experiments investigating behavior in which players may make inferences about the intentions behind others' prior actions based on higher‐ or lower‐accuracy information about those actions. We investigate a trust game with first mover trembling, a game in which nature determines whether the first mover's decision is implemented or reversed. The results indicate that second movers give first movers the benefit of the doubt. However, first movers do not anticipate this response. Ultimately, it appears that subjects are thinking on at least three levels when making decisions: they are concerned with their own material well‐being, the trustworthiness of their counterpart, and how their own actions will be perceived.
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