可观测性
经济
集合(抽象数据类型)
行为经济学
动作(物理)
消费者需求
领域(数学)
微观经济学
营销
业务
计算机科学
物理
量子力学
程序设计语言
纯数学
数学
应用数学
作者
Christine L. Exley,Jeffrey Naecker
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2016-07-27
卷期号:63 (10): 3262-3267
被引量:27
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2501
摘要
Previous research often interprets the choice to restrict one’s future opportunity set as evidence for sophisticated time inconsistency. We propose an additional mechanism that may contribute to the demand for commitment technology: the desire to signal to others. We present a field experiment where participants can choose to give up money if they do not follow through with an action. When commitment choices are made public rather than kept private, we find significantly higher uptake rates. Data are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2501 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
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