亲爱的研友该休息了!由于当前在线用户较少,发布求助请尽量完整地填写文献信息,科研通机器人24小时在线,伴您度过漫漫科研夜!身体可是革命的本钱,早点休息,好梦!

Optimal vehicle fleet planning and collaboration under carbon neutrality: a game-theoretic perspective

服务提供商 碳中和 环境经济学 业务 代理(哲学) 服务(商务) 收入 营销 温室气体 经济 财务 生态学 生物 认识论 哲学
作者
Su Xiu Xu,Yu Ning,Huibing Cheng,Abraham Zhang,Yuan Gao,George Q. Huang
出处
期刊:International Journal of Production Research [Taylor & Francis]
卷期号:62 (12): 4389-4406 被引量:5
标识
DOI:10.1080/00207543.2023.2262053
摘要

This paper studies the optimal vehicle fleet planning and collaboration problem for two transport service providers and a carbon emission treatment agency under carbon neutrality. One is a provider of transport services deploying commercial electric vehicles (CEVs), and the other is a provider of transport services using fuel vehicles (FVs). Our work is motivated by the recent global emphasis on carbon neutrality. The FV transport service provider pays a fixed fee or a portion of its sales revenue to a carbon emission treatment agency in exchange for technology to reduce its carbon emissions. We formulate a game-theoretic framework among the two transport service providers and a carbon emission treatment agency, in which the FV transport provider can adopt three strategies (i.e., no emission reduction (S1), purchasing technology for emission reduction (S2), and entrusting a carbon emission treatment agency (S3)), resulting in three potential game scenarios. We derive each party’s optimal fleet size, price, and profit in the three scenarios. Furthermore, we expand the model for a company with a blended fleet of CEVs and FVs, and explore the effect of consumer green preference and the purchase cost per CEV on this company’s strategy selection. Our results suggest that carbon emission reduction strategies may improve the market performance of the FV transport service provider. Then, we find no certain strategy is always preferable to another: the optimal cooperation strategy between the transport service provider and carbon emission treatment agency depends on the fixed technology fee, ratio of revenue sharing, government penalty, the transport service market potential, and consumer green preference, as well as the cost per CEV. When the market potential is large enough the carbon emission treatment agency should cooperate with the FV transport service provider through strategy S3. This paper gives the transport service provider and carbon emission treatment agency a full picture of whether, when, and how to collaborate in green commerce.
最长约 10秒,即可获得该文献文件

科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI
科研通是完全免费的文献互助平台,具备全网最快的应助速度,最高的求助完成率。 对每一个文献求助,科研通都将尽心尽力,给求助人一个满意的交代。
实时播报
拼搏宛儿完成签到,获得积分10
3秒前
10秒前
标致的满天完成签到 ,获得积分10
10秒前
12秒前
kk_happy应助Scorpia112采纳,获得100
12秒前
务实的方盒完成签到 ,获得积分10
15秒前
wanci应助杰尼龟006采纳,获得10
16秒前
16秒前
共享精神应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
17秒前
阿姨好感动完成签到,获得积分10
18秒前
语行完成签到 ,获得积分10
18秒前
胖胖猪完成签到,获得积分10
29秒前
30秒前
Zoe发布了新的文献求助10
34秒前
42秒前
研友_VZG7GZ应助Zoe采纳,获得10
46秒前
XY发布了新的文献求助10
47秒前
姜鹏完成签到,获得积分10
51秒前
52秒前
Aliya完成签到 ,获得积分0
52秒前
害羞的语芹完成签到 ,获得积分10
58秒前
共享精神应助Daisykiller采纳,获得10
59秒前
NexusExplorer应助你泽采纳,获得20
1分钟前
1分钟前
ZYB发布了新的文献求助10
1分钟前
木有完成签到 ,获得积分0
1分钟前
杰尼龟006发布了新的文献求助10
1分钟前
1分钟前
顾矜应助吴逸彪采纳,获得10
1分钟前
噜噜晓完成签到 ,获得积分10
1分钟前
你泽发布了新的文献求助20
1分钟前
机智的孤兰完成签到 ,获得积分10
1分钟前
英姑应助ZYB采纳,获得10
1分钟前
卡卡东完成签到 ,获得积分10
1分钟前
忧郁小鸽子完成签到,获得积分10
1分钟前
nnn发布了新的文献求助10
1分钟前
1分钟前
吴逸彪发布了新的文献求助10
1分钟前
1分钟前
Owen应助zhang采纳,获得10
1分钟前
高分求助中
(应助此贴封号)【重要!!请各用户(尤其是新用户)详细阅读】【科研通的精品贴汇总】 10000
Developing Genetic Editing Tools for Lysobacter 2000
Моделирование процессов самоорганизации в кристаллообразующих системах 1000
History of U.S. Space Surveillance and Satellite Cataloging 1000
Adhesion Science: Principles & Practice 800
Signals, Systems, and Signal Processing 610
Fundamentals of Pharmaceutical and Biologics Regulations: A Global Perspective, Second Edition 600
热门求助领域 (近24小时)
化学 材料科学 医学 生物 纳米技术 工程类 有机化学 化学工程 生物化学 计算机科学 物理 内科学 复合材料 催化作用 物理化学 光电子学 电极 细胞生物学 基因 无机化学
热门帖子
关注 科研通微信公众号,转发送积分 6522858
求助须知:如何正确求助?哪些是违规求助? 8316053
关于积分的说明 17792582
捐赠科研通 5625015
什么是DOI,文献DOI怎么找? 2928050
邀请新用户注册赠送积分活动 1904775
关于科研通互助平台的介绍 1764925