Optimal vehicle fleet planning and collaboration under carbon neutrality: a game-theoretic perspective

服务提供商 碳中和 环境经济学 业务 代理(哲学) 服务(商务) 收入 营销 温室气体 经济 财务 生态学 生物 认识论 哲学
作者
Su Xiu Xu,Yu Ning,Huibing Cheng,Abraham Zhang,Yuan Gao,George Q. Huang
出处
期刊:International Journal of Production Research [Taylor & Francis]
卷期号:62 (12): 4389-4406 被引量:5
标识
DOI:10.1080/00207543.2023.2262053
摘要

This paper studies the optimal vehicle fleet planning and collaboration problem for two transport service providers and a carbon emission treatment agency under carbon neutrality. One is a provider of transport services deploying commercial electric vehicles (CEVs), and the other is a provider of transport services using fuel vehicles (FVs). Our work is motivated by the recent global emphasis on carbon neutrality. The FV transport service provider pays a fixed fee or a portion of its sales revenue to a carbon emission treatment agency in exchange for technology to reduce its carbon emissions. We formulate a game-theoretic framework among the two transport service providers and a carbon emission treatment agency, in which the FV transport provider can adopt three strategies (i.e., no emission reduction (S1), purchasing technology for emission reduction (S2), and entrusting a carbon emission treatment agency (S3)), resulting in three potential game scenarios. We derive each party’s optimal fleet size, price, and profit in the three scenarios. Furthermore, we expand the model for a company with a blended fleet of CEVs and FVs, and explore the effect of consumer green preference and the purchase cost per CEV on this company’s strategy selection. Our results suggest that carbon emission reduction strategies may improve the market performance of the FV transport service provider. Then, we find no certain strategy is always preferable to another: the optimal cooperation strategy between the transport service provider and carbon emission treatment agency depends on the fixed technology fee, ratio of revenue sharing, government penalty, the transport service market potential, and consumer green preference, as well as the cost per CEV. When the market potential is large enough the carbon emission treatment agency should cooperate with the FV transport service provider through strategy S3. This paper gives the transport service provider and carbon emission treatment agency a full picture of whether, when, and how to collaborate in green commerce.
最长约 10秒,即可获得该文献文件

科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI
科研通是完全免费的文献互助平台,具备全网最快的应助速度,最高的求助完成率。 对每一个文献求助,科研通都将尽心尽力,给求助人一个满意的交代。
实时播报
RJ关注了科研通微信公众号
刚刚
刚刚
赘婿应助Sally采纳,获得10
1秒前
1秒前
科研通AI6.1应助90采纳,获得10
1秒前
wy.he应助xy采纳,获得30
1秒前
1秒前
1秒前
郭先生完成签到,获得积分10
2秒前
沫沫完成签到,获得积分10
2秒前
qiaqia0326完成签到,获得积分10
2秒前
彩色半烟完成签到,获得积分0
2秒前
cJLin发布了新的文献求助10
2秒前
yaofox1发布了新的文献求助10
2秒前
深情安青应助踏实幻巧采纳,获得10
3秒前
3秒前
3秒前
3秒前
4秒前
DrTT完成签到,获得积分20
4秒前
双持裤衩武器战应助土块采纳,获得30
5秒前
酒酿是也发布了新的文献求助10
5秒前
暴躁的店员完成签到,获得积分10
5秒前
学术z发布了新的文献求助10
5秒前
bkagyin应助Rainbow采纳,获得10
5秒前
侯人雄应助美妮采纳,获得10
5秒前
6秒前
6秒前
6秒前
Stayalive发布了新的文献求助10
7秒前
淡然映容完成签到,获得积分10
7秒前
简单的琦发布了新的文献求助30
7秒前
小邹发布了新的文献求助10
7秒前
tt完成签到,获得积分10
8秒前
DrTT发布了新的文献求助30
8秒前
Cdragon完成签到,获得积分10
8秒前
8秒前
z泽泽完成签到,获得积分10
8秒前
李健应助完美的皮卡丘采纳,获得10
8秒前
大力的灵雁应助淡定电话采纳,获得30
9秒前
高分求助中
Inorganic Chemistry Eighth Edition 1200
Standards for Molecular Testing for Red Cell, Platelet, and Neutrophil Antigens, 7th edition 1000
HANDBOOK OF CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS 106th edition 1000
ASPEN Adult Nutrition Support Core Curriculum, Fourth Edition 1000
The Psychological Quest for Meaning 800
Signals, Systems, and Signal Processing 610
脑电大模型与情感脑机接口研究--郑伟龙 500
热门求助领域 (近24小时)
化学 材料科学 医学 生物 纳米技术 工程类 有机化学 化学工程 生物化学 计算机科学 物理 内科学 复合材料 催化作用 物理化学 光电子学 电极 细胞生物学 基因 无机化学
热门帖子
关注 科研通微信公众号,转发送积分 6303138
求助须知:如何正确求助?哪些是违规求助? 8119899
关于积分的说明 17004181
捐赠科研通 5363104
什么是DOI,文献DOI怎么找? 2848432
邀请新用户注册赠送积分活动 1825937
关于科研通互助平台的介绍 1679724