Optimal vehicle fleet planning and collaboration under carbon neutrality: a game-theoretic perspective

服务提供商 碳中和 环境经济学 业务 代理(哲学) 服务(商务) 收入 营销 温室气体 经济 财务 生态学 生物 认识论 哲学
作者
Su Xiu Xu,Yu Ning,Huibing Cheng,Abraham Zhang,Yuan Gao,George Q. Huang
出处
期刊:International Journal of Production Research [Taylor & Francis]
卷期号:62 (12): 4389-4406 被引量:5
标识
DOI:10.1080/00207543.2023.2262053
摘要

This paper studies the optimal vehicle fleet planning and collaboration problem for two transport service providers and a carbon emission treatment agency under carbon neutrality. One is a provider of transport services deploying commercial electric vehicles (CEVs), and the other is a provider of transport services using fuel vehicles (FVs). Our work is motivated by the recent global emphasis on carbon neutrality. The FV transport service provider pays a fixed fee or a portion of its sales revenue to a carbon emission treatment agency in exchange for technology to reduce its carbon emissions. We formulate a game-theoretic framework among the two transport service providers and a carbon emission treatment agency, in which the FV transport provider can adopt three strategies (i.e., no emission reduction (S1), purchasing technology for emission reduction (S2), and entrusting a carbon emission treatment agency (S3)), resulting in three potential game scenarios. We derive each party’s optimal fleet size, price, and profit in the three scenarios. Furthermore, we expand the model for a company with a blended fleet of CEVs and FVs, and explore the effect of consumer green preference and the purchase cost per CEV on this company’s strategy selection. Our results suggest that carbon emission reduction strategies may improve the market performance of the FV transport service provider. Then, we find no certain strategy is always preferable to another: the optimal cooperation strategy between the transport service provider and carbon emission treatment agency depends on the fixed technology fee, ratio of revenue sharing, government penalty, the transport service market potential, and consumer green preference, as well as the cost per CEV. When the market potential is large enough the carbon emission treatment agency should cooperate with the FV transport service provider through strategy S3. This paper gives the transport service provider and carbon emission treatment agency a full picture of whether, when, and how to collaborate in green commerce.
最长约 10秒,即可获得该文献文件

科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI
科研通是完全免费的文献互助平台,具备全网最快的应助速度,最高的求助完成率。 对每一个文献求助,科研通都将尽心尽力,给求助人一个满意的交代。
实时播报
1秒前
5999完成签到 ,获得积分10
1秒前
细心香烟完成签到 ,获得积分10
1秒前
爱喝牛奶的大兔子完成签到,获得积分10
1秒前
健忘的日记本完成签到 ,获得积分10
1秒前
虚拟的涟妖完成签到 ,获得积分10
2秒前
Stygain完成签到 ,获得积分10
2秒前
wu完成签到,获得积分10
2秒前
村口烫头祁师傅完成签到,获得积分10
2秒前
快来拾糖完成签到,获得积分10
3秒前
3秒前
领导范儿应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
3秒前
SciGPT应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
3秒前
Akim应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
3秒前
赘婿应助活力睿渊采纳,获得10
3秒前
Ava应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
3秒前
Orange应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
3秒前
无情芷珊应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
3秒前
纷雪完成签到,获得积分10
3秒前
CipherSage应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
3秒前
甜瓜大王应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
3秒前
3秒前
Willa应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
4秒前
4秒前
李健应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
4秒前
慕青应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
4秒前
4秒前
英姑应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
4秒前
传奇3应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
4秒前
收破烂的要不完成签到,获得积分10
4秒前
小不点mark完成签到,获得积分10
4秒前
独闯江湖应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
4秒前
wanci应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
4秒前
CodeCraft应助tuo采纳,获得10
4秒前
CipherSage应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
4秒前
搜集达人应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
4秒前
川三完成签到,获得积分10
4秒前
丘比特应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
4秒前
5秒前
5秒前
高分求助中
(应助此贴封号)【重要!!请各用户(尤其是新用户)详细阅读】【科研通的精品贴汇总】 10000
Introduction to Helicopter and Tiltrotor Flight Simulation, Second Edition 2500
卤化钙钛矿人工突触的研究 2000
Malcolm Fraser : a biography 700
Signals, Systems, and Signal Processing 610
Software that combines deep learning,3D reconstruction and CFD to analyze the state of carotid arteries from ultrasound imaging 600
Bounds for Statistical Estimation in Semiparametric Models 500
热门求助领域 (近24小时)
化学 材料科学 医学 生物 纳米技术 工程类 有机化学 化学工程 生物化学 计算机科学 物理 内科学 复合材料 催化作用 物理化学 光电子学 电极 细胞生物学 基因 无机化学
热门帖子
关注 科研通微信公众号,转发送积分 6498564
求助须知:如何正确求助?哪些是违规求助? 8294374
关于积分的说明 17698220
捐赠科研通 5594705
什么是DOI,文献DOI怎么找? 2917705
邀请新用户注册赠送积分活动 1894721
关于科研通互助平台的介绍 1755358