利润(经济学)
业务
产业组织
竞赛(生物学)
产品(数学)
质量(理念)
新产品开发
博弈论
微观经济学
营销
计算机科学
经济
几何学
数学
生态学
哲学
认识论
生物
作者
Sunanda Katewa,Tarun Jain
出处
期刊:IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers]
日期:2023-02-09
卷期号:71: 4862-4875
被引量:1
标识
DOI:10.1109/tem.2023.3237742
摘要
Recently, e-commerce platforms like Amazon and Flipkart have started collaborating with sellers to introduce the product in competition with an existing seller on the platform. The collaborating seller and the platform firm make significant investments that determine the quality of the product. Considering such collaboration dynamics, we investigated should the platform invest early in the product development or wait for the collaborating seller? We adopted the game-theoretic approach to solve the above problem. Our analysis revealed that under the scenario where sellers do not have wholesale pricing power and quality improvement effectiveness in codeveloping the product is low, the platform makes a higher profit when all players simultaneously decide the efforts. Otherwise, the platform earns a higher profit when it invests after observing the efforts of both sellers. Interestingly, when the sellers strategically decide wholesale prices, the platform always makes a maximum profit when it invests after observing investments by the sellers.
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