债权人
业务
盈利能力指数
金融体系
信息共享
金融危机
货币经济学
样品(材料)
经济
财务
债务
政治学
色谱法
宏观经济学
化学
法学
作者
Joel F. Houston,Chen Lin,Ping Lin,Yue Ma
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.02.008
摘要
Looking at a sample of nearly 2,400 banks in 69 countries, we find that stronger creditor rights tend to promote greater bank risk taking. Consistent with this finding, we also show that stronger creditor rights increase the likelihood of financial crisis. On the plus side, we find that stronger creditor rights are associated with higher growth. In contrast, we find that the benefits of information sharing among creditors appear to be universally positive. Greater information sharing leads to higher bank profitability, lower bank risk, a reduced likelihood of financial crisis, and higher economic growth.
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