斯塔克伯格竞赛
激励
供应链
业务
晋升(国际象棋)
产业组织
利润(经济学)
供求关系
垄断
微观经济学
博弈论
环境经济学
经济
营销
政治
法学
政治学
作者
XinXin Peng,Tao Yuhong,Chunmei Wang,Zhen Zhong
标识
DOI:10.1093/ijlct/ctac051
摘要
Abstract Considering the low-carbon supply chain led by one manufacturer and followed by one retailer, market demand is influenced by the investment of low-carbon product promotion and the degree of emission reduction. Stackelberg game theory is used to construct the game models with no-incentive model and three incentive models, respectively. The equilibrium solutions of the degree of low-carbon products promotion, the degree of low-carbon products emission reduction, the market demand, the cost-sharing ratio of the manufacturer to the retailer’s low-carbon products promotion, the degree of government’s incentive to the manufacturer’s low-carbon products, as well as the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profit are obtained in the four models. Finally, with the results, we provide some policy suggestions for the management and practice of a low-carbon supply chain.
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