补贴
约束(计算机辅助设计)
供应链
政府(语言学)
业务
产业组织
微观经济学
经济
市场经济
营销
数学
语言学
哲学
几何学
摘要
Motivated by the challenge of meeting carbon-conscious consumers and carbon regulations, this paper expounded on the decisions and coordination in low-carbon supply chains with a wholesale price constraint (WPC). The WPC is the behavior of large retailers (e.g., Walmart and Amazon) that pursue a profit margin that does not fall below a certain level, which can affect supply chain operations. First, we develop a competition model, revealing that the WPC can result in a loss of system profit and a shortage in carbon emission reduction and then pose systematic challenges. Following this, we design a Nash bargaining-based cooperation model, showing that it can coordinate the supply chain and achieve a continuous allocation of optimal profits according to the bargaining power of firms. Lastly, our extended analysis incorporates the external influence of government subsidies and designs the optimal government subsidy mechanism. We demonstrate that, while government subsidies can reduce cost pressures on the supplier and provide incentives to reduce carbon emission, they can also induce the retailer to set a higher WPC for greater profitability, so the performance loss remains prominent. In this circumstance, we construct a Nash bargaining-based cooperation model that can coordinate the supply chain. Overall, our insights can help firms achieve scientific carbon emission reduction and formulate a reasonable WPC, as well as provide a quantitative basis for government carbon regulations.
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