激励
行权
公司治理
业务
衡平法
中国
库存(枪支)
会计
货币经济学
财务
经济
微观经济学
机械工程
艺术
政治学
法学
视觉艺术
工程类
作者
Yongliang Zeng,Xiangfang Zhao,Yiwen Zhu
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.frl.2023.104592
摘要
Using Chinese A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2021, we investigate the impact of executive equity incentive plans (EEIPs) on corporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. We find that EEIPs positively affect ESG performance. We also find that options have a stronger incentive effect on ESG performance than restricted stock, and longer valid period and higher vesting targets can enhance the incentive effect of EEIPs on ESG performance. Moreover, the positive impact of EEIPs on ESG performance is stronger for non-SOEs and firms with better external governance.
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