The Emission Reduction Technology Decision of the Port Supply Chain

The technology options for sustainable development are explored with customer low-carbon preference in a port supply chain consisting of one ship and one port. Port supply chains can opt for either shower power or low-sulfur fuel oil to cut down emissions. We set game models considering three power structures: the port dominant (port-led Stackelberg game), the ship dominant (ship-led Stackelberg game), and the port and ship on the same footing (Nash game). We compare the performances of different technologies. It is shown that, when customer low-carbon preference and carbon tax are both low, LSFO is the appropriate choice from the supply chain’s profit perspective, SP is preferred from the emission control perspective, and LSFO is preferred from the social welfare perspective. However, when customers’ low-carbon preferences, carbon tax, and environmental concerns are all low or all high, LSFO should be adopted from the view of social welfare. The profits and carbon emissions of the supply chain in the Nash game are higher than those in the Stackelberg game. While the environmental concern is low, the social welfare of the supply chain in the Nash game is greater than that in the Stackelberg game. Otherwise, it is less than that in the Stackelberg game. The obtained results can help governments formulate policies and ships make emission reduction technology decisions according to their own interests.