分水岭
付款
激励
补偿(心理学)
业务
中国
生态系统服务费
构造盆地
环境规划
生态系统服务
流域
环境资源管理
流域管理
差速器(机械装置)
地理
政治学
经济
生态学
工程类
计算机科学
生态系统
财务
法学
航空航天工程
机器学习
古生物学
微观经济学
生物
地图学
心理学
精神分析
作者
Jichuan Sheng,Cheng Qian,You Wu
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jenvman.2022.116670
摘要
Through the case of China's Xin'an River Basin Eco-compensation Pilot (XRBEP), this study mobilizes the concept of hydrosocial territories to scrutinize how the watershed conservation behavior of stakeholders in payment for watershed services (PWS) evolves in response to eco-compensation and the coordination of interests. By drawing on the extensive literature on differential games, this study opens up our view of the complex relationship between PWS and the coordination of interests. After comparing the simulated and actual results of XRBEP, this study highlights that the coordination of interests in transboundary PWS can ultimately be socially optimal by reconciling the interests of different administrative territories. Furthermore, designing incentive-compatible coordination mechanisms of interest in transboundary PWS remains challenging, depending on the reconfiguration of PWS hydrosocial territories. Finally, the horizontal eco-compensation as a PES-like application can maximize the supply of watershed services, thus becoming a suboptimal and realistic option for realizing transboundary PWS.
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