硬件特洛伊木马
特洛伊木马
对手
利用
计算机科学
嵌入式系统
计算机安全
外包
硬件安全模块
计算机硬件
密码学
政治学
法学
作者
Ayush Jain,Ziqi Zhou,Ujjwal Guin
标识
DOI:10.1109/iscas51556.2021.9401143
摘要
The outsourcing of the design and manufacturing of Integrated Circuits (ICs) poses a severe threat to our critical infrastructures as an adversary can exploit them by bypassing the security features by activating a hardware Trojan. These malicious modifications in the design introduced at an untrusted fabrication site can virtually leak any secret information from a secure system to an adversary. This paper discusses all three different hardware Trojan models, such as combinational, sequential, and analog Trojans. We provide a survey of the recent advancements in Trojan detection techniques classified based on their applicability to different Trojans types. We describe a practical approach recently developed using the characterization of Electro-Optical Frequency Mapping (EOFM) images of the chip to detect a hardware Trojan by identifying malicious state elements. This survey also presents open problems with Trojan detection and suggests future research directions in hardware Trojan detection.
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