Stackelberg Game-Based Power Allocation for V2X Communications

Ultra-reliable low-latency communication (URLLC) is one of the three usage scenarios anticipated for 5G, which plays an important role in advanced applications of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications. In this paper, the Stackelberg game-based power allocation problem was investigated in V2X communications underlaying cellular networks. Assuming that the macro-cellular base station (MBS) sets the interference prices to protect itself from the V2X users (VUEs), the Stackelberg game was adopted to analyze the interaction between MBS and VUEs, where the former acts as a leader and the latter act as followers. For MBS, we aimed at maximizing its utility from interference revenue while considering the cost of interference. Meanwhile, the VUEs aimed at maximizing their utilities per unit power consumption. We analyzed the Stackelberg model and obtained the optimal prices for MBS and optimal transmit powers for VUEs. Simulation results demonstrated the superiority of the proposed Stackelberg game-based power allocation scheme in comparison with the traditional power allocation strategy. Meanwhile, the proposed scheme achieved a better trade-off between economic profit and power consumption.