Nudge citizen participation by framing mobilization information: a survey experiment in China

AbstractAbstractDespite many efforts to promote citizen participation, it is necessary to keep exploring more efficient mobilization ways in developing countries. From the bounded rationality perspective, the authors conducted a survey experiment in China to explore the effects of a public–personal interest frame and a gain–loss frame on citizen participation. The results revealed that emphasizing public interests attracted more citizen participation than emphasizing personal interests did, and citizens were more mobilized by losing benefits due to non-participation than they were by gaining benefits due to participation. Moreover, the public–personal frame interacted with the gain–loss frame to influence citizen participation. Specifically, people were more likely mobilized to participate by public interests than by personal interests in a gain frame but not in a loss frame. These findings contribute to the understanding of bounded rationality in citizen participation and indicate the potential of framing effect to nudge citizen participation.Keywords: Citizen participationbounded rationalityframing effectinterest framenegativity bias Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsBingsheng LiuBingsheng Liu is a research professor at the School of Public Policy and Administration at the Chongqing University.Sen LinSen Lin is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Politics at the University of Exeter.Xiaohao YuanXiaohao Yuan is a teacher at the School of Public Policy and Administration at the Chongqing University.Siqi HeSiqi He is a doctoral candidate at the School of Public Policy and Administration at the Chongqing University.Jinfeng ZhangJinfeng Zhang is an associate professor at the School of Public Policy and Administration at the Chongqing University.Notes1 Fung, “Putting the Public Back into Governance,” 513–522; Denhardt and Denhardt, “The New Public Service,” 549–559; Feeney and Welch, “Electronic Participation Technologies,” 815–833; Liu et al., “Do Citizen Participation Programs,” 341–371; Balla, “Retrofitting Leninism,” 605–606.2 Osborne et al., “A New Theory for Public Service Management,” 135–158.3 Fung, “Putting the Public Back into Governance,” 513–522.4 Beebeejaun and Grimshaw, “Is the ‘New Deal for Communities’,” 1997–2011; Graaf, “Examining Citizen Participation,” 875–881.5 Dai et al., “Exploring Key Determinants of Willingness.”6 Percy, “Citizen Participation in the Coproduction,” 431–446; Wilson, “Planning and Politics,” 242–249.7 Zhuang et al., “The Role of Stakeholders,” 47–58; Huang and Yu, “Leading Digital Technologies for Coproduction,” 513–532.8 Denhardt and Denhardt. “The New Public Service,” 549–559; Osborne, “The New Public Governance?” 377–387; Leao and Izadpahani, “Factors Motivating Citizen Engagement,” 85–103; Sjoberg et al., “The Effect of Bureaucratic Responsiveness,” 340–351; Yang et al., “Enlisting Citizens,” 400–417.9 Battaglio et al., “Behavioral Public Administration Ad Fontes,” 304–320.10 Tversky and Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions,” 453–458; Druckman, “The Implications of Framing Effects,” 225–256.11 Zamir and Sulitzeanu-Kenan, “Explaining Self-Interested Behavior,” 579–592; Simon, “Rationality in Political-Behavior,” 45–61.12 Triandis, “Individualism-Collectivism and Personality,” 907–924; Oyserman et al., “Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism,” 3–72; Zhang and Yin, “Collaborative Cheating among Chinese College Students,” 54–69.13 Rozin and Royzman, “Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion,” 296–320; James and Moseley, “Does Perfarmance Information about Public Services,” 493–511; Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty,” 1124–1131.14 Miller and Krosnick, “Threat as a Motivator of Political Activism,” 507–523; Baekgaard, “Prospect Theory and Public Service Outcomes,” 927–942.15 Zamir and Sulitzeanu-Kenan, “Explaining Self-Interested Behavior,” 579–592.16 Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty,” 1124–1131.17 Fung, “Putting the Public Back into Governance,” 513–522; Mario Ianniello et al., “Obstacles and Solutions on the Ladder of Citizen Participation,” 21–46.18 Sjoberg et al., “The Effect of Bureaucratic Responsiveness,” 340–351; Arnstein, “Ladder of Citizen Participation,” 216–224; Tai et al., “Can E-Participation Stimulate Offline Citizen Participation,” 278–296.19 Zimmerman and Rappaport, “Citizen Participation, Perceived Control,” 725–750.20 Fung, “Putting the Public Back into Governance,” 513–522; Jakobsen and Andersen, “Coproduction and Equity in Public Service Delivery,” 704–713.21 Fung, “Putting the Public Back into Governance,” 513–522; Roberts, “Public Deliberation in an Age,” 315–353; Jo and Nabatchi, “Different Processes, Different Outcomes?”22 Osborne, “The New Public Governance?” 377–387; Bingham et al., “The New Governance,” 547–558.23 Leao and Izadpahani, “Factors Motivating Citizen Engagement,” 85–103; Xu et al., “Sense of Community,” 259–271.24 Nagao and Kennedy, “The Rite to Vote,” 613–630; Yi et al., “The Influence of Religious Belief.”25 Brabham, “Motivations for Participation in a Crowdsourcing Application,” 307–328.26 Sjoberg et al., “The Effect of Bureaucratic Responsiveness,” 340–351; Jakobsen, “Can Government Initiatives Increase Citizen Coproduction?” 27–54.27 Li et al., “Analysis of Citizens’ Motivation”; Jones, “Bounded Rationality,” 297.28 Zamir and Sulitzeanu-Kenan, “Explaining Self-Interested Behavior,” 579–592; Petra et al., “Are Citizens More Negative,” 1–22.29 Simon, “Rationality in Political-Behavior,” 45–61; Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty,” 1124–1131; Kahneman, “A Perspective on Judgment and Choice,” 697–720; Montibeller and Von Winterfeldt, “Cognitive and Motivational Biases,” 1230–1251.30 Jones, “Bounded Rationality and Political Science,” 395–412.31 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge; Button, “Bounded Rationality without Bounded Democracy,” 1034–1052.32 Oliver, “Nudging, Shoving, and Budging,” 700–714; Benartzi et al., “Should Governments Invest More in Nudging?” 1041–1055.33 Button, “Bounded Rationality without Bounded Democracy,” 1034–1052.34 See note 9 above.35 Tversky and Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions,” 453–458; Simon, “Rationality in Political-Behavior,” 45–61.36 Tversky and Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions,” 453–458.37 Druckman, “The Implications of Framing Effects,” 225–256.38 Levin et al., “All Frames Are not Created Equal,” 149–188.39 Olsen et al., “Green Claims and Message Frames,” 119–137; Meyerowitz and Chaiken, “The Effect of Message Framing,” 500–510; Schneider et al., “The Effects of Message Framing and Ethnic Targeting,” 256–266; Penta and Baban, “Message Framing in Vaccine Communication,” 299–314.40 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action.41 Ostrom, Governing the Commons.42 See note 11 above.43 Abu-Tayeh et al., “Exploring the Motives of Citizen Reporting Engagement,” 215–226.44 Rand and Nowak, “Human Cooperation,” 413–425.45 Yang and Ott, “What Motivates the Public?” 832–842.46 Li et al., “Analysis of Citizens’ Motivation.”47 Triandis, “Individualism-Collectivism and Personality,” 907–924; Oyserman et al., “Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism,” 3–72.48 Zhang and Yin, “Collaborative Cheating among Chinese College Students,” 54–69.49 Adres et al., “Globalization and the Retreat of Citizen Participation,” 142–152.50 Zhang and Weng, “Not All Cultural Values Are Created Equal,” 144–154; Hsu and Barker, “Individualism and Collectivism,” 695–714.51 Olsen, “Leftmost-Digit-Bias in an Enumerated Public Sector?” 365–371; Nagtegaal et al., “Designing to Debias,” 565–576.52 Stanovich and West, “Individual Differences in Reasoning,” 645–726.53 Kahneman, “A Perspective on Judgment and Choice,” 697–720.54 Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty,” 1124–1131; Evans and Stanovich, “Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition,” 223–241.55 Baekgaard, “Prospect Theory and Public Service Outcomes,” 927–942; Knobloch-Westerwick et al., “Confirmation Bias, Ingroup Bias,” 104–124.56 Battaglio et al., “Behavioral Public Administration Ad Fontes,” 304–320; Rozin and Royzman, “Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion,” 296–320; James and Moseley, “Does Perfarmance Information about Public Services,” 493–511; George et al., “Institutional Isomorphism, Negativity Bias,” 14–28; Olsen, “Citizen (Dis)satisfaction,” 469–478.57 Gerber et al., “The Comparative Effectiveness,” 996–1011.58 Arceneaux and Nickerson, “Comparing Negative and Positive Campaign,” 54–83.59 Mann et al., “Do Negatively Framed Messages,” 3–21.60 Porumbescu et al., “Only Hearing What They Want to Hear.”61 Miller and Krosnick, “Threat as a Motivator of Political Activism,” 507–523.62 See note 15 above.63 Rand and Nowak, “Human Cooperation,” 413–425; Moore and Loewenstein, “Self-Interest, Automaticity,” 189–202.64 Hughes and Zaki, “The Neuroscience of Motivated Cognition,” 62–64.65 Metzger et al., “Social and Heuristic Approaches,” 413–439.66 Aguinis and Bradley, “Best Practice Recommendations,” 351–371.67 Liu et al., “Can Local Governments’ Disclosure,” 1–19.68 See note 46 above.69 Nabatchi et al., “Varieties of Participation in Public Services,” 766–776.70 Oyserman et al., “Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism,” 3–72.71 Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty,” 1124–1131; Meyerowitz and Chaiken, “The Effect of Message Framing,” 500–510.72 Karlsson et al., “The Ostrich Effect,” 95–115.73 See note 15 above.74 Hughes and Zaki, “The Neuroscience of Motivated Cognition,” 62–64; Metzger et al., “Social and Heuristic Approaches,” 413–439.75 See note 10 above.76 Arceneaux and Butler, “How Not to Increase Participation,” 131–139.77 Li and De Jong, “Citizen Participation in China’s Eco-City Development,” 1085–1094.78 Ajzen, “The Theory of Planned Behavior,” 179–211; Yadav and Pathak, “Determinants of Consumers’ Green Purchase Behavior,” 114–122.