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微观经济学
生产(经济)
业务
风险中性
功能(生物学)
预期短缺
产业组织
经济
风险管理
营销
财务
生物
进化生物学
市场经济
出处
期刊:Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice
[Elsevier]
日期:2011-01-01
被引量:3
摘要
Thecompany + farmercontract-farming supply chain model consisting of one risk-neutral company and one risk-averse farmer is proposed and the conditional value-at-risk(CVaR) method is utilized to describe the objective decision function of risk-averse farmer.The farmer's optimal decision making behavior under decentralized supply chain is analyzed.The results show that the risk-averse farmer's optimal production quantity will be increased with the increasing of contract purchasing price and definitely less than that of risk-neutral farmer.In addition,the results also show that the farmer's optimal production quantity under decentralized decision mode will be less than that of centralized decision mode,which gives further need to develop a kind ofpurchasing subsidy + market protection price + guarantee moneycoordination mechanism to realize supply chain coordination.The satisfaction conditions for company's optimal subsidy coefficient and ordering price are also provided.The feasibility and efficiency of the proposed models are manifested by numerical examples.
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