A Stackelberg Game Pricing Through Balancing Trilateral Profits in Big Data Market
斯塔克伯格竞赛
计算机科学
博弈论
大数据
数据建模
微观经济学
经济
数据库
操作系统
作者
Zheng Xiao,Dan He,Jiayi Du
出处
期刊:IEEE Internet of Things Journal [Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers] 日期:2020-06-09卷期号:8 (16): 12658-12668被引量:18
标识
DOI:10.1109/jiot.2020.3001010
摘要
With the popularity of the Internet of Things (IoT) and large-scale deployment of sensors, data have exploded. Big data is utilized to extract useful knowledge and information and served as data services to consumers. While most of the current researches in the field of big data services focus on developing and improving algorithms for data mining and information extraction, and rarely studies "big data" from an economic perspective. This article thus studies the pricing and profit maximization problems in big data markets from an economic perspective. First, a method of quantifying the value of data is proposed to study the utility of raw data. Then, we build an economic model of the data market, which consists of three parties: 1) data vendor; 2) service provider; and 3) service users. The data vendor gathers various raw data and sells them to the service provider. The raw data are further processed into data services by a service provider, who provides service subscriptions to users to obtain profits. The interactions among them are formulated as a Stackelberg game to maximize the profits of all participators. The existence and uniqueness of equilibria pricing strategies are proved. Finally, numerical results show that the participators of the data market can achieve the maximum profit through the proposed pricing mechanism and economic model.