Two-sided matching model considering multi-information fusion of stakeholders

• Design the generalized preference order under multi-information. • Design internal and external comparative methods to reflect subjects’ psychology. • Design a fee calculation method to reflect intermediary revenue demand. • The proposed model obtains a stable matching scheme that satisfies stakeholders. Obtaining stable solutions through intermediary services in two-sided markets is an effective way to solve the complex matching demands that exist widely in society. Aiming at the various preference information and individual bounded rationality often faced in actual matching, this paper proposes a two-sided matching model that considers the demands of subjects and the intermediary. Firstly, generalized preference order determination methods for three commonly used index types, numerical value, interval number, and unordered enumeration, are proposed, which solve the problem that it is difficult for subjects to determine preferences based on multiple indexes. Secondly, the common expected preference order algorithm not only ensures that the matching objects of each subject are within its acceptable range, but also selects the valid comparison objects of each subject. Thirdly, the overall comparative satisfaction of each subject is obtained through internal and external comparative advantage determination methods, which reasonably reflects the subject's reference-dependent psychological behavior under the combined influence of social and individual dimensions. On the basis of designing the calculation method of intermediary fee under different matching options, with the goal of maximizing subject satisfaction and intermediary revenue, a stable matching optimization model is constructed and solved. Finally, the effectiveness and practicability of the proposed model are verified through a practical case study of product R&D demand matching under the manufacturing service platform.