有限理性
进化稳定策略
进化博弈论
序贯博弈
正常形式游戏
政府(语言学)
背景(考古学)
欺骗
业务
博弈论
经济
微观经济学
法学
政治学
古生物学
语言学
哲学
生物
作者
Meixuan Li,Wei Liu,Chun Yan,Mengchao Zhang
出处
期刊:IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems
[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers]
日期:2023-10-02
卷期号:11 (2): 2901-2917
被引量:1
标识
DOI:10.1109/tcss.2023.3313626
摘要
Insurance fraud not only increases the burden on policyholders but may even affect the normal operation of insurance companies. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, this article establishes the tripartite evolutionary game matrix for policyholders, insurance companies, and government departments. In this article, Gaussian white noise is introduced to simulate the random interference encountered by each subject in the evolutionary game, and the evolutionary stability strategy of the tripartite stochastic evolutionary game under different conditions is discussed. Considering the importance of fraud recognition rate, the recognition accuracy rate is introduced into the stochastic evolutionary game, and the necessity of introducing fraud recognition rate into the game is proved by simulation. In the context of society, we have joined the government supervision department into the game and realized the supervision mode of social co-governance by using the social public opinion to reward and punish the government reputation.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI