业务
财务
经济干预主义
债务
代理(统计)
内债
政府(语言学)
债务融资
金融体系
内部融资
机器学习
哲学
政治
法学
语言学
计算机科学
政治学
作者
Kegui Wang,Juxian Wang,Nan Dong
标识
DOI:10.1080/1540496x.2022.2042249
摘要
Few studies examine how government intervention influences debt financing costs. We use firm ownership by government-guided funds ("GG funds" or "GGFs") as a proxy for government intervention and explore whether and how GG funds influence debt financing costs. Using a 2009–2020 sample of A-share listed firms in China, we find that GG funds significantly increase debt financing costs, mainly because firms held by GGFs signal more information regarding their poor financial situation and performance to debt providers, which thus charge higher interest rates for loans. Moreover, this effect is stronger for firms located in the eastern region, for firms with a higher market index and for non-SOEs (vs. SOEs). Overall, we provide evidence that the government plays an important monitoring role in debt financing costs through GGF ownership.
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