经济租金
繁荣
政治
激励
寻租
经济
制度经济学
贫穷
国家(计算机科学)
公共财政
经济体制
透视图(图形)
经济实力
政治经济学
发展经济学
经济增长
政治学
市场经济
新古典经济学
算法
人工智能
计算机科学
法学
宏观经济学
作者
Daron Acemoğlu,James A. Robinson
出处
期刊:Public Choice
[Springer Nature]
日期:2019-03-13
卷期号:181 (1-2): 13-28
被引量:79
标识
DOI:10.1007/s11127-019-00645-z
摘要
We present the approach to comparative economic development of Why Nations Fail. Economic prosperity requires inclusive economic institutions—those which create broad based incentives and opportunities in society. Extractive economic institutions, which lack these properties, create poverty. Variation in economic institutions is created by differences in political institutions. Inclusive economic institutions are the result of political choices which arise under inclusive political institutions: a strong state and a broad distribution of power in society. When either of these conditions fails one has extractive political institutions that lead to extractive economic institutions. We relate our analysis to Tullock’s notion of ‘rent seeking’.
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