Decision model for binary safety management behavior in a supply chain under digital scenarios: A study based on differential game theory

The purpose of this study is to expand and deepen research in the field of safety production, explore the role of enterprises as decision-making entities in safety production, analyze the role of different types of decision-making behaviors in the process of enterprise safety production, and provide certain theoretical guidance for multi-agent decision-making in safety production. By summarizing and comparing the existing dual system of supply chain safety management, this study proposes dividing supply chain safety management into the two categories of safety organization and safety research and development (safety R&D) in the context of digitalization. Differential equations are established to describe a two-level supply chain safety management problem including manufacturers and suppliers. The research results show that, compared with the Nash equilibrium, when there are strong manufacturers involved in safety management cooperation, the manufacturer's safety R&D subsidy to suppliers improves the total revenue of the supply chain. When the manufacturer's safety organization supervision efficiency is high, the Stackelberg equilibrium is lower. It is a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer to supervise the supplier's safety organization to the Nash equilibrium. In the case of dual safety cooperation in the supply chain, when there are strong manufacturers, R&D subsidies have a crowding out effect on the safety organization cooperation. Finally, based on the example analysis, relevant suggestions are put forward for supply chain safety management.