The military application of artificial intelligence technology in the United States, China, and Russia and the implications for global security

ABSTRACTA number of studies have considered the theoretical role that Artificial Intelligence (AI) may play in shaping the global balance of power in the future. While these studies are informative, we currently lack an understanding regarding the precise manner AI technologies are being applied and incorporated in militaries in major power states. Thus, in this study, we examine how AI technology is being applied in the militaries in the US, China, and Russia and analyse the implications for the future of AI, global military competition, and international security. We examine current research on the military application of AI technology in the US, China, and Russia and conduct expert interviews with leading AI experts in academia, think tanks, multinational technology companies, and the military to better understand how AI technology is being applied in the three major powers states and the implications for global security.KEYWORDS: Artificial intelligencemilitary applicationsUSChinaRussiaglobal security Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 CNBC, 'Putin: Leader in Artificial Intelligence will Rule World', Published September 4, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/04/putin-leader-in-artificial-intelligence-will-rule-world.html (accessed May 20, 2022).2 J. Pandya, 'The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence', Forbes, Published January 14, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/01/14/the-weaponization-of-artificial-intelligence/?sh=4a26af193686 (accessed May 20, 2022).3 M. Tegmark, Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence (New York: NY, Penguin Random House, 2017), 188.4 Congressional Research Service (CRS), 'Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense – Issues for Congress', 2022.5 See note 4: ii.6 M. C. Horowitz, 'Artificial Intelligence, Competition, and the Balance of Power', Texas National Security Review 1, no. 3 (2018): 37–57.7 A. Radin, et al., 'China-Russia Cooperation. Determining Factors, Future Trajectories, Implications for the United States, RAND Corporation', 2021.8 K. Blachford, 'The Balance of Power and the Power Struggles of the Polis', Journal of International Political Theory 17, no. 3 (2021): 429–447.9 Ibid.10 G. Allen and T. Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2017).11 K. Ayoub and K. Payne, 'Strategy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence', Journal of Strategic Studies 39 no. 5–6 (2016): 793–819.12 J. Johnson, Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare: The USA, China, and strategic stability (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020).13 F. E. Morgan, B. Boudreaux, A. J. Lohn, M. Ashby, C. Curriden, K. Klima, and D. Grossman, Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence: Ethical Concerns in an Uncertain World (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Project Air Force, 2020).14 Ayoub and Payne, 'Strategy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence', 795.15 See note 2.16 S. Davis, 'Artificial Intelligence at the Operational Level of War'. Defense and Security Analysis (2021): 5.17 J. Sung, T. Nguyen, M. Cantos, C. P. Daniel, M. Kronauge, A. P. Mason, J. Ugolini, and M. E. Westerman, 'AI: Using Standards to Mitigate Risks'. Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program. US Department of Homeland Security, Defense Intelligence Agency, FireEye, Guideposts, Hilliard Heintze, National Black Leadership Commission on Aids, Rand Corporation, Terbium Labs, 2018, 4, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2018_AEP_Artificial_Intelligence.pdf.18 See note 12.19 C. Tate and G, Allen, 'Artificial Intelligence and National Security', Belfer Study Center, 2017.20 J. Johnson, 'Deterrence in the Age of Artificial Intelligence & Autonomy: A Paradigm Shift in Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Practice?' Defense and Security Analysis 36 no. 4 (2021): 422–448.21 It is important to note that aggregated data on AI defence spending are unavailable for many countries and years due to the classified nature of AI defence spending at the aggregate level. In addition, limited information exists regarding AI funding in Russia. Lastly, the data included in the tables are from 2015–2020 because AI defence spending data are less reliable prior to 2015 and are unavailable after 2020.22 J. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Department of Defense Washington United States, 2018).23 See note 16: 5.24 M. Weinger, 'The Future Military Artificial-Intelligence Complex?', Financial Times, 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/f589cec7-5dae-3dd8-a1ee-a4b2cd270179.25 D. S. Hoadley and N. J. Lucas, 'Artificial Intelligence and National Security', The Congressional Research Service (2018): 13.26 See note 22: 9.27 C. H. Heller, 'Near-Term Applications of Artificial Intelligence', Naval War College Review 72, no. 4 (2019): 6. Department of Defense, 'Defense Budget Overview for Fiscal Year 2021', Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer, 2020.28 AI Pathfinders 'fuse data from military, commercial and government sensors to create a common operating picture for North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command' (Strout 2021). Project Maven refers to the sorting through intelligence footage to discover information and patterns (P. Tucker, 'US Navy Turns to Drones, AI to Monitor Rust', Defense One, 2020, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/08/us-navy-turns-drones-ai-monitor-rust/168036/).29 Heller, 'Near-Term Applications of Artificial Intelligence'.30 Congressional Research Service (CRS), 'The Army's Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress', 2021.31 See note 30.32 W. Roper, 'Exclusive: AI Just Controlled a Military Plane for the First Time Ever', Popular Mechanics, 2020, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a34978872/artificial-intelligence-controls-u2-spy-plane-air-force-exclusive/.33 Ibid.34 S. Azeem, 'Autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: A Technology Warning Assessment', The George Washington University, Tech Rep., 2012.35 Ibid.36 Lockheed Martin, 'Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM)', Lockheed Martin, 2020, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/long-range-anti-ship-missile.html.37 See note 30.38 Ibid.39 Ibid.40 T. Macaulay, 'The US Navy is Developing AI-Powered Submarines That Could Kill Autonomously', TNW | Neural, 2020, https://thenextweb.com/news/the-us-navy-is-developing-ai-powered-submarines-that-could-kill-autonomously.41 Ibid.42 Tucker, 'US Navy Turns to Drones'.43 China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, 'Artificial Intelligence and Its Military Implications', Stanley Center Discussion Paper, 2019, https://stanleycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ArtificialIntelligence-ItsMilitaryImplications-China.pdf.44 See note 13: 54.45 J. Lee, H. Davari, J. Singh, and V. Pandhare, 'Industrial Artificial Intelligence for Industry 4.0-based Manufacturing Systems', Manufacturing Letters 18 (2018): 20–23.46 Ibid.47 See note 30.48 Ibid.49 M. Konaev, H. Chahal, R. Fedasiuk, T. Huan, and I. Rahovsky, 'US Military Investments in Autonomy and AI A Budgetary Assessment', Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 30, 2020.50 M. Sisson, 'The Militarization of Artificial Intelligence Stimson Center', Stimson Center, 4, 2019, https://www.stimson.org/2020/the-militarization-of-artificial-intelligence/.51 S. De Spiegeleire, M. Matthijs, and S. Tim, Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Defense: Strategic Implications for Small-and Medium-sized Force Providers (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017), 90.52 World Bank, 'Military Expenditure (% of GDP) – United States, China', 2022, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=US-CN.53 M. Konaev, H. Chahal, R. Fedasiuk, T. Huan, and I. Rahovsky, 'US Military Investments in Autonomy and AI. A Budgetary Assessment', Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 2020.54 Ibid.55 R. Steff and K. Abbasi, 'Artificial Intelligence and the Military Balance of Power', in Emerging Technologies and International Security, ed. R. Steff, J. Burton, S. R. and Soare (Routledge, 2020).56 See note 22.57 See note 22: 7.58 This refers to the numerical calculations that are used in computer algorithms that run many AI programs and systems.59 See note 16.60 See note 16.61 See note 52: 79.62 Ibid.63 See note 30: 22.64 CNA, 'The China and Autonomy Report', 2021, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/centers/CNA/CIP/China/ai-newsletters/ChinaAI-Autonomy-Report-Issue-1.pdf.65 See note 13: 60.66 Ibid.67 See note 13: 61.68 B. Stauffer, 'Stopping Killer Robots: Country Positions on Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons and Retaining Human Control', Human Rights Watch (2020): Para. 38.69 See note 43.70 See note 52: 79.71 See note 13.72 See note 25.73 See note 13.74 L. Saalman, 'The Impact of AI on Nuclear Deterrence: China, Russia, and the United States', EastWestCenter.org, 2020.75 Ibid.76 Ibid.77 See note 43.78 See note 43.79 See note 43.80 See note 25: 22.81 A. Llachinski, 'AI, Robots, and Swarms Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies', CNA, 2017.82 Staff, 'War at Hyperspeed', The Economist, 2018.83 See note 13.84 Ibid.85 See note 13: 61.86 Xinhua News Agency, 'Scientific and Technological Innovation, a Powerful Engine for a World Class Army – The Fourth Document on the Leadership and Promotion of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jingping at its Core', Xinhua News Agency, Published September 15, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-09/15/content_5225216.html.87 J. Hall, 'Artificial Intelligence in the South China Sea', Global Risk Insights, 2018: para. 3, https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/12/artificial-intelligence-turning-tide-asia-pacific/.88 Ibid.89 Ibid.90 See note 13.91 L. Saalman, 'China and Its Hybrid Warfare Spectrum', in Hybrid Warfare: Security and Asymmetric Conflict in International Relations, ed. M. Weissmann, N. Nilsson, B. Palmertz, and P. Thunholm (London: I.B. Bloomsbury Collections, 2022).92 See note 7.93 See note 13: 61.94 See note 13: 66.95 See note 13: 67.96 Ibid.97 OODA Loops refers to a dynamic decision-making process that is used by militaries and other organizations that involves four parts: observe, orient, decide, act.98 See note 13.99 Ibid.100 T. Heath, 'China's Military Has No Combat Experience: Does it Matter?', RAND Corporation, 2018.101 See note 52: 80.102 Ibid.103 A. H. Cordesman and G. Hwang, 'Updated Report: Chinese Strategy and Military Forces in 2021', Center for Strategic International Studies, Published August 3, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/updated-report-chinese-strategy-and-military-forces-2021.104 H. Huifeng, 'China Tech Firms Embrace Inward Economic Pivot, But Some Wary of "Technological Isolation"', South China Morning Post, 2020.105 D. Faggella, 'AI in China – Recent History, Strengths and Weaknesses of the Ecosystem', Emerj, 2019, https://emerj.com/ai-market-research/ai-in-china-recent-history-strengths-and-weaknesses-of-the-ecosystem/.106 Ibid.107 S. Feldstein, 'The Road to Digital Unfreedom: How Artificial Intelligence is Reshaping Repression', Journal of Democracy 30 no. 1 (2019).108 See note 106.109 CNA, 'Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy in Russia', 2021, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/centers/CNA/sppp/rsp/russia-ai/Russia-Artificial-Intelligence-Autonomy-Putin-Military.pdf.110 See note 25: 12.111 See note 25: 25.112 Y. Borisov, 'The Development of Artificial Intelligence is Essential for the Successful Conduct of Cyberwarfare', Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2018.113 See note 110.114 R. Norvosti, 'Putin Spoke About the Latest Types of Russian Weapons', РИА Новости, 2018, https://ria.ru/20180301/1515566394.html.115 See note 110.116 A. Nadibaizde, 'Russian Perceptions of Military AI, Automation, and Autonomy', Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2022.117 Tate and Allen, 'Artificial Intelligence and National Security', Belfer Study Center, 2017, 21.118 See note 25.119 See note 52: 82.120 Ibid.121 R. J. Marks and S. Bendett, 'Russia is Systematically Copying U.S. Military AI Robotics', Mind Matters, 2020, https://mindmatters.ai/2020/10/russia-is-systematically-copying-u-s-military-ai-robotics/.122 See note 75: 41.123 Ibid.124 B. Wodecki, 'Russia's AI Army: Drones, AI-Guided Missiles and Autonomous Tanks', Internet of Things World Today, 2022.125 Ibid.126 Ibid.127 See note 125: para. 12.128 See note 75.129 See note 75: 41.130 S. Bendett, 'In AI, Russia is Hustling To Catch Up', Defense One, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/04/russia-races-forward-aidevelopment/147178/.131 M. Peck, 'Russia Wants To Use AI-Sea Mines To Sink America's Navy', The National Interest, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-wants-use-ai-sea-mines-sink-americas-navy-120951.132 R. J. Marks and S. Bendett, 'Russia Aims To Close the Technology Gap with the United States', Mind Matters, 2020, https://mindmatters.ai/2020/10/russia-aims-to-close-the-technology-gap-with-the-united-states/.133 Ibid.134 V. Boulanin, L. Saalman, P. Topychkanov, F. Su, and M. Carlsson, 'Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk', Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2020.135 See note 110: 38.136 See note 53.137 See note 122.138 Ibid.139 J. Harper, 'China Matching Pentagon Spending on AI', National Defense, 2022.Additional informationNotes on contributorsLance Y. HunterLance Y. Hunter, PhD, is an Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Social Sciences and Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies program at Augusta University located in Augusta, GA, USA. His expertise is in security studies and democratization. His research focuses on the causes and effects of terrorism and interstate conflict, democratization, and the relationship between evolving technology and conflict.Craig D. AlbertDr. Craig D. Albert, PhD, is Professor and Director of the Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies at Augusta University. He received his PhD from the University of Connecticut in 2009. His areas of concentration include international security studies, ethnic conflict, cyberterrorism, and cyberwar.Christopher HenninganChristopher Hennigan is a consultant in Deloitte's Government & Public Services firm. He is a graduate of Augusta University's Masters in Intelligence and Security Studies program. His expertise is in Six Sigma and PMO, business risks and mitigation, and machine learning process automation. His research focuses on machine learning, cybersecurity, terrorism, and AI game theory.Josh RutlandJosh Rutland is a graduate of Augusta University's Masters in Intelligence and Security Studies program. He currently works as a researcher in the Augusta University Department of Emergency Medicine and will soon be employed by U.S. Army Cyber Command as an Information Technology Specialist. His research focuses on information warfare, cybersecurity, terrorism, and biosecurity.