Forewarned Is Forearmed? Contingent Sourcing, Shipment Information, and Supplier Competition

业务 订单(交换) 战略式采购 供应链 报童模式 竞赛(生物学) 产业组织 利润(经济学) 供应商关系管理 微观经济学 供应链管理 营销 经济 财务 生物 战略财务管理 战略规划 生态学
作者
Tao Lu,Brian Tomlin
出处
期刊:Manufacturing & Service Operations Management [Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
卷期号:25 (5): 1796-1813 被引量:1
标识
DOI:10.1287/msom.2021.0540
摘要

Problem definition: Dual sourcing and contingent sourcing are important risk-mitigation strategies to manage supply chain risks, including transportation-related losses of inbound orders. Contingent sourcing as a means of managing transportation risk is made possible by shipment information realized at in-transit inspection points or through shipment monitoring technologies. We examine the impact of contingent sourcing and shipment information in a setting where a buyer can source from two competing suppliers. One supplier (unreliable) has a long transportation lead time and is prone to in-transit yield loss; the other supplier (reliable) has a short, but nonzero, lead time with no yield loss. Methodology/results: We analyze a multistage game-theoretical model in which the two suppliers compete on wholesale prices and then, the buyer determines initial order quantities. Later, the buyer can place an emergency order with the reliable supplier based on shipment information, which reveals (possibly imperfectly) the status of the in-transit order from the unreliable supplier. We show that the buyer will adopt one of four possible sourcing strategies: (1) initially source only from the unreliable supplier but resort to the reliable supplier contingent on the updated shipment information, (2) diversify its initial order across the two suppliers but resort to the reliable supplier if needed, (3) diversify its initial order and not engage in contingent sourcing, or (4) sole source from the reliable supplier. Interestingly, contingent sourcing may or may not benefit the buyer because it may soften the competition between suppliers. Moreover, the buyer’s profit may not be monotonic in the accuracy of shipment information. Managerial implications: The buyer must design its supply base so that the unreliable supplier is particularly cost efficient if the buyer is to benefit from the possibility of contingent sourcing. The buyer may not always benefit from operational improvements that enhance shipment information accuracy because they may soften supplier competition. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0540 .
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