谈判
大裂谷
功率(物理)
结算(财务)
业务
差速器(机械装置)
争议解决
亲社会行为
对偶(语法数字)
议价能力
法律与经济学
社会心理学
心理学
公共关系
微观经济学
政治学
经济
工程类
法学
财务
天文
航空航天工程
付款
艺术
量子力学
文学类
物理
标识
DOI:10.1177/87569728241261306
摘要
Negotiating parties commencing a negotiation are likely to have different levels of intention to settle. Is this attributed to the power differential among them? Little is known about this. Applying power-dependency theory and dual concern theory, this study proposes a power-motive-intention framework, which is empirically tested using the structural equation modeling (SEM) method. The results indicate that negotiating parties with high perceived power could enhance their proself motive and suppress their prosocial motive, thereby stifling the intention to settle. To alleviate this dark side of power, psychological bonding agents, including trust and shared vision, are found to be effective alleviating agents.
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