Surrogacy and the significance of gestation: Implications for law and policy

Gestational surrogacy is ethically complex, generating very different responses in law and policy worldwide. This paper argues that contemporary surrogacy law and policy, across many jurisdictions, fail to give sufficient attention to the significance of the relationship between the child and the gestational surrogate. This failure risks repeating the mistakes of historical, discredited approaches to adoption and donor-assisted conception. This paper argues that proper recognition of the significance of gestation must be an organising principle in surrogacy law and policy. The paper begins by pointing to examples of surrogacy law and practice where the role of the gestator is unacceptably minimised, most notably the framing of the surrogate as a mere 'carrier'. It goes on to examine the nature of gestation, including consideration of contemporary scholarship on the metaphysics of pregnancy and emerging work in epigenetics, and argues that current evidence supports the view that the gestational relationship must be taken more seriously than it currently is. The paper then draws analogies with parenthood in donor-assisted conception and adoption to argue that approaches to parental status in novel family formations that fail to promote transparency and seek to deny the truth of familial relationships are doomed to fail. The paper concludes by suggesting some implications for law and policy that flow from placing sufficient emphasis on the gestational role. The overarching thesis of this paper is that gestational surrogacy is ethically permissible when these fundamental requirements are adhered to, and that surrogacy law should proceed on this basis.