The Costs and Benefits of Clan Culture: Elite Control versus Cooperation in China

Kinship ties are a common institution that may facilitate in-group coordination and cooperation.Yet their benefits -or lack thereof -depend crucially on the broader institutional environment.We study how the prevalence of clan ties affect how communities confronted two well-studied historical episodes from the early years of the People's Republic of China, utilizing four distinct proxies for county clan strength: the presence of recognized ancestral halls; genealogical records; rice suitability; and geographic latitude.We show that the loss of livestock associated with 1955-56 collectivization (which mandated that farmers surrender livestock for little compensation) documented by Chen and Lan (2017) was much less pronounced in strong-clan areas.By contrast, we show that the 1959-61 Great Famine was associated with higher mortality in areas with stronger clan ties.We argue that reconciling these two conflicting patterns requires that we take a broader view of how kinship groups interact with other governance institutions, in particular the role of kinship as a means of elite control.