避税
应纳税所得额
衡平法
高管薪酬
货币经济学
激励
经济
冒险
税制改革
间接税
业务
公共经济学
微观经济学
会计
财务
法学
政治学
作者
Mehmet C. Kara,Michael Mayberry,Scott G. Rane
标识
DOI:10.1111/1911-3846.12862
摘要
Abstract We examine how executive equity incentives are associated with firms' conforming tax avoidance. Conforming tax avoidance is unique compared to nonconforming tax avoidance in that it decreases tax liabilities by reducing pretax income. Thus, conforming tax avoidance presents a unique set of consequences with important links to both risk and value‐creation incentives. Consistent with risk‐taking incentives increasing conforming tax avoidance, we find that linking executive wealth to stock price volatility (i.e., vega) is positively associated with conforming tax avoidance. We also find that linking executive wealth to stock price (i.e., delta) is negatively associated with conforming tax avoidance. The results of our cross‐sectional tests suggest that the negative association between delta and conforming tax avoidance is predominantly driven by a risk aversion effect rather than a value‐creation effect. Our findings add to the literature on the relation between tax avoidance and executive compensation, as well as the trade‐off between book and taxable income.
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