业务
透明度(行为)
公司治理
持久性(不连续性)
会计
偏爱
全面披露
质量(理念)
企业社会责任
财务
经济
公共关系
微观经济学
哲学
法学
岩土工程
工程类
认识论
计算机科学
计算机安全
政治学
摘要
Abstract Advocates of an increased focus on environmental, social and governance (ESG) initiatives have argued that increased ESG disclosure is a necessary first step. Given the limited regulatory requirements on ESG disclosure, managerial preference serves as a primary determinant of ESG transparency. Using data on ESG disclosure from Bloomberg, I examine the extent to which disclosure persistence on the behalf of firm management, as proxied by managerial tenure, affects firms' ESG disclosure strategies. Overall, I find that ESG disclosure quality and ESG disclosure variability are reduced as management tenure increases. Further, I find that the replacement of a firm's CEO interrupts disclosure persistence; e.g., median ESG disclosure scores increase by roughly 9.7% in the two years following the replacement of a firm's CEO. The results of this study highlight one inhibitor, i.e. persistence, to inducing more complete, transparent ESG disclosure.
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