劳动经济学
人工费
代理成本
激励
业务
机会成本
二级劳动力市场
利润(经济学)
经济
劳动关系
市场经济
微观经济学
财务
公司治理
机械工程
股东
工程类
作者
Hui Xu,Kam C. Chan,Chaohong Na,Qiaoling Fang
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102356
摘要
We examine whether having an internal labor market can help a firm affiliated with a privately owned business group (POBG) reduce labor cost stickiness. Our findings suggest that, when a POBG-affiliated firm experiences a decrease in sales, it has lower labor cost stickiness than an otherwise equivalent firm that is not affiliated with a POBG. Specifically, we find that, on average, a POBG-affiliated firm entirely mitigates labor cost stickiness when it has a decrease in sales. In addition, we document that, to adjust its labor cost downward, a POBG-affiliated firm hires fewer employees, rather than paying lower wages. We show that the lower labor cost stickiness is due to movement of employees from the focal firm to other firms within the same POBG. When sales fall, the POBG reallocates excess employees at the focal firm to other firms within the business group via an internal labor market, and the focal firm thereby increases its per capita profit. Moreover, we find that agency cost mediates the impact of a POBG on labor cost stickiness. When the external market is less effective or the POBG headquarters have strong incentives, the effect of POBG affiliation on the reduction in an affiliated firm's labor cost stickiness is more salient.
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