公司治理
系统性风险
业务
财务困境
审计
会计
内部审计
金融危机
金融体系
财务
经济
宏观经济学
作者
Doriana Cucinelli,Maria Gaia Soana
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102601
摘要
The paper investigates the impact of four key corporate governance mechanisms - board, audit, compensation and ownership, and anti-takeover provisions - on the exposure and contribution to systemic risk of >400 US non-financial companies (NFCs) listed in S&P500 from 2005 to 2020. Our results show that in NFCs, unlike in banks, good corporate governance practices constrain both systemic risk exposure and contribution. We find a complementary effect between internal corporate governance mechanisms in reducing both the contribution and the exposure to systemic risk, and a substitution effect between internal and external governance practices in constraining the exposure of NFCs to systemic risk. Moreover, strong corporate governance practices are shown to constrain systemic risk both in steady-state conditions and in times of distress.
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