Research on safety input behaviour decision of tower crane from a collaborative perspective

Purpose As tower cranes are highly dangerous, the problem of insufficient investment in tower safety needs to be solved urgently, and this study aims to solve the problem of insufficient investment in safety caused by the imbalance of interests of tower safety-related subjects and to propose targeted solutions. Design/methodology/approach Tower crane rental enterprises, contractors and government departments are selected to construct the game model, calculate the equilibrium point and stability and determine the optimal stabilization strategy. Finally, MATLAB software is used to model and simulate the impact of parameter changes on each party’s choice of strategies. Findings (1) The optimal combination of strategies is safety input by tower companies, leasing of qualified towers by contractors and providing non-financial incentives by the government. (2) The degree of synergistic coefficient γ, the level of government penalty coefficient α and the increase in accident probability p positively affect the adoption of proactive safety measures by tower crane leasing enterprises and contractors. (3) Excessive differences in safety costs may lead firms to adopt hostile safety measures. Originality/value This paper creatively uses safety input and tower crane leasing enterprises as the perspective and object of research on tower security. The research results are of great significance in guiding the government to formulate regulatory and incentive policies and in promoting enterprises to implement safety input to ensure construction safety collaboratively. It also provides new research cases for promoting the entire special equipment industry to realize adequate and effective safety input.