Dual-channel recycling e-waste pricing decision under the impact of recyclers’ loss aversion and consumers’ bargaining power

The issue of e-waste recycling is imminent. With the continuous enhancement of Internet technology and people's awareness of sustainable development, the dual-channel reverse supply chain management combining online and offline becomes particularly important. In order to promote the sustainable development of dual-channel reverse supply chain recycling, this paper uses Stackelberg game and Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game, and builds a dual-channel reverse supply chain model under the influence of loss aversion of recyclers and bargaining power of consumers. The purpose of this paper is to explore the recycling pricing decision of dual-channel reverse supply chain under the dual impact of loss aversion of recyclers and bargaining power of consumers. The results show that the increase in loss aversion of recyclers makes the recycling price of dual-channel recyclers decrease, but it increases their profits; the enhanced bargaining power of consumers raises the recycling price of products and increases the profits of members; the competition of recycling channels helps to improve the recycling price and profit of each member of the reverse supply chain. The results of this study provide theoretical basis for the members of dual-channel reverse supply chain to make optimal decisions in the case of bounded rationality, thereby promoting the sustainable development of reverse supply chain.