竞赛(生物学)
产品差异化
经济
微观经济学
产品(数学)
私人信息检索
福利
班级(哲学)
经济盈余
消费者福利
价格歧视
信号(编程语言)
古诺竞争
计算机科学
市场经济
生物
计算机安全
人工智能
数学
生态学
程序设计语言
几何学
作者
Mark Armstrong,Jidong Zhou
摘要
This paper studies competition between firms when consumers observe a private signal of their preferences over products. Within the class of signal structures that induce pure-strategy pricing equilibria, we derive signal structures that are optimal for firms and those that are optimal for consumers. The firm-optimal policy amplifies underlying product differentiation, thereby relaxing competition, while ensuring consumers purchase their preferred product, thereby maximizing total welfare. The consumer-optimal policy dampens differentiation, which intensifies competition, but induces some consumers to buy their less preferred product. Our analysis sheds light on the limits to competition when the information possessed by consumers can be designed flexibly. (JEL D11, D21, D43, D82, D83, L13)
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