计算机科学
云计算
加密
计算机安全
可验证秘密共享
访问控制
计算机网络
操作系统
程序设计语言
集合(抽象数据类型)
作者
Hui Ma,Rui Zhang,Zhiguo Wan,Yao Lu,Suqing Lin
出处
期刊:IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers]
日期:2017-11-01
卷期号:14 (6): 679-692
被引量:92
标识
DOI:10.1109/tdsc.2015.2499755
摘要
We propose two ciphertext-policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanism (CP-AB-KEM) schemes that for the first time achieve both outsourced encryption and outsourced decryption in two system storage models and give corresponding security analysis. In our schemes, heavy computations are outsourced to Encryption Service Providers (ESPs) or Decryption Service Providers (DSPs), leaving only one modular exponentiation computation for the sender or the receiver. Moreover, we propose a general verification mechanism for a wide class of ciphertext-policy (cf. key-policy) AB-KEM schemes, which can check the correctness of the outsourced encryption and decryption efficiently. Concretely, we introduce a stronger version of verifiability (cf. [1] ) and a new security notion for outsourced decryption called exculpability, which guarantees that a user cannot accuse DSP of returning incorrect results while it is not the case. With all these mechanisms, any dispute between a user and an outsource computation service provider can be easily resolved, furthermore, a service provider will be less motivated to give out wrong results. Finally, we implement our schemes in Charm [2] , and the results indicate that the proposed schemes/mechanisms are efficient and practical.
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