Medium-term scheduling of operating states in electric power systems

This article presents a mathematical model for the medium-term scheduling of the operating states of electric power systems. The scheduling period is divided into several time intervals. The model can be used to determine the equilibrium state in which each supplier earns maximum profit from supplying electricity to the wholesale market. We estimated the maximum value of public welfare, which indicates the total financial gains of suppliers and consumers, to determine the prices at the nodes of the power system. This was done by considering the balance constraints at the nodes of the power system and constraints on the allowable values of generation, power flows, and volumes of energy resources consumed over several time intervals. This problem belongs to the class of bi-level Stackelberg game-theoretic models with several leaders. The market equilibrium is modeled simultaneously in several intervals, given the multiplicity and duration of interactions. We considered two approaches for solving the multi-interval equilibrium state problem. The first approach involved directly solving a system of joint optimality conditions for electricity suppliers and consumers. The second approach involved iterative searches until the equilibrium state was reached. This article presents the results of medium-term scheduling using a case study of a simplified real-world power system.