道德
概念化
道德的社会认知理论
认识论
道德心理学
多元主义(哲学)
心理学
道德解脱
道德发展
基础(证据)
多样性(控制论)
社会心理学
哲学
法学
语言学
人工智能
计算机科学
政治学
作者
Jesse Graham,Jonathan Haidt,Spassena Koleva,Matt Motyl,Ravi Iyer,Sean P. Wojcik,Peter H. Ditto
出处
期刊:Advances in Experimental Social Psychology
日期:2013-01-01
卷期号:47: 55-130
被引量:820
标识
DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4
摘要
Abstract Where does morality come from? Why are moral judgments often so similar across cultures, yet sometimes so variable? Is morality one thing, or many? Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) was created to answer these questions. In this chapter, we describe the origins, assumptions, and current conceptualization of the theory and detail the empirical findings that MFT has made possible, both within social psychology and beyond. Looking toward the future, we embrace several critiques of the theory and specify five criteria for determining what should be considered a foundation of human morality. Finally, we suggest a variety of future directions for MFT and moral psychology.
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