中国
公司治理
股东
代理(哲学)
会计
业务
委托代理问题
功率(物理)
国家(计算机科学)
企业社会责任
公司法
经济体制
经济
政治学
财务
公共关系
法学
社会学
计算机科学
量子力学
社会科学
物理
算法
作者
Fuxiu Jiang,Kenneth A. Kim
出处
期刊:Review of Finance
[Oxford University Press]
日期:2020-04-17
卷期号:24 (4): 733-772
被引量:455
摘要
Abstract This article surveys corporate governance in China, as described in a growing literature published in top journals. Unlike the classical vertical agency problems in Western countries, the dominant agency problem in China is the horizontal agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders arising from concentrated ownership structure; thus one cannot automatically apply what is known about the USA to China. As these features are also prevalent in many other countries, insights from this survey can also be applied to countries far beyond China. We start by describing controlling shareholder and agency problems in China, and then discuss how law and institutions are particularly important for China, where controlling shareholders have great power. As state-owned enterprises have their own features, we separately discuss their corporate governance. We also briefly discuss corporate social responsibility in China. Finally, we provide an agenda for future research.
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