竞争优势
业务
竞赛(生物学)
激励
弱势群体
锦标赛
产业组织
资源(消歧)
营销
微观经济学
经济
计算机科学
经济增长
数学
生物
计算机网络
组合数学
生态学
作者
Patrick Hallila,Hans T. W. Frankort,Paolo Aversa
标识
DOI:10.5465/amj.2022.0946
摘要
The tournament literature has typically traced employees' competitive actions to characteristics of individual-level career tournaments. Yet, such individual-level tournaments usually transcend firms that themselves compete in a firm-level tournament. We study the cross-level implications of a firm-level tournament for the competitive actions that constituent employees undertake against other individuals internal and external to their firm. We propose a theory of individual reputational incentives, which predicts that a firm's competitive threats decrease its employees' internal competitive actions yet increase their external competitive actions, while a firm's competitive opportunities increase employees' internal and external competitive actions. The theory also predicts that these effects are largest when a firm faces potential unexpected losses or gains in its standing, such as when the firm experiences competitive threats from resource-disadvantaged firms, or competitive opportunities against resource-advantaged firms. In panel data on the population of motorcycle riders competing in MotoGP from 2004 to 2020, we examine these hypotheses using overtakes to measure riders' internal and external competitive actions. Our findings reveal how riders adjust their internal and external overtakes based on their team's competitive threats and opportunities, and on the relative resource endowments of the teams supplying such threats or opportunities.
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