风险厌恶(心理学)
排放交易
经济
微观经济学
控制(管理)
依赖关系(UML)
机制(生物学)
中立
调节器
钥匙(锁)
计量经济学
期望效用假设
计算机科学
金融经济学
生态学
哲学
生物化学
化学
计算机安全
管理
软件工程
认识论
基因
温室气体
生物
作者
Sascha Kollenberg,Luca Taschini
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jeem.2016.09.003
摘要
Emissions Trading Systems (ETSs) with fixed caps lack provisions to address systematic imbalances in the supply and demand of permits due to changes in the state of the regulated economy. We propose a mechanism which adjusts the allocation of permits based on the current bank of permits. The mechanism spans the spectrum between a pure quantity instrument and a pure price instrument. We solve the firms׳ emissions control problem and obtain an explicit dependency between the key policy stringency parameter—the adjustment rate—and the firms׳ abatement and trading strategies. We present an analytical tool for selecting the optimal adjustment rate under both risk-neutrality and risk-aversion, which provides an analytical basis for the regulator׳s choice of a responsive ETS policy.
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