Habits as knowledge structures: Automaticity in goal-directed behavior.

This study tested the idea of habits as a form of goal-directed automatic behavior.Expanding on the idea that habits are mentally represented as associations between goals and actions, it was proposed that goals are capable of activating the habitual action.More specific, when habits are established (e.g., frequent cycling to the university), the very activation of the goal to act (e.g., having to attend lectures at the university) automatically evokes the habitual response (e.g., bicycle).Indeed, it was tested and confirmed that, when behavior is habitual, behavioral responses are activated automatically.In addition, the results of 3 experiments indicated that (a) the automaticity in habits is conditional on the presence of an active goal (cf.goal-dependent automaticity; J. A. Bargh, 1989), supporting the idea that habits are mentally represented as goal-action links, and (b) the formation of implementation intentions (i.e., the creation of a strong mental link between a goal and action) may simulate goal-directed automaticity in habits.The majority of people's actions are executed on a routine basis.The better part of the behavioral repertoire is frequently exhibited in the same physical and social environment and has taken on a habitual character (e.g., James, 1890;Ouellette & Wood, 1998;Triandis, 1980).These habits are extremely useful in that they enable one to perform one's actions in a mindless, automatic fashion.James (1890) emphasized the importance of habits: "We must make automatic and habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can" (p.122).James's reasoning was straightforward.The more actions one can delegate to the unconscious, the more room there is to do things that necessarily require conscious processing.Writing an article would be a more difficult affair if typing (and driving, and taking a shower, and even brushing one's teeth) required conscious planning.