政府(语言学)
补贴
供应链
端口(电路理论)
斯塔克伯格竞赛
社会福利
业务
投资(军事)
微观经济学
碳排放税
纳什均衡
博弈论
风险厌恶(心理学)
环境经济学
产业组织
经济
期望效用假设
市场经济
温室气体
生态学
营销
语言学
政治
政治学
法学
电气工程
生物
工程类
哲学
数理经济学
作者
Xingyu Huang,Guiyun Liu,Pengjun Zheng
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2023.106564
摘要
With the goal of achieving carbon peak and neutrality, the government and enterprises are trying their best to speed up the decarbonization process in the shipping industry. To analyze the long-term game behaviors of a port, a shipping company, and a forwarder under simultaneous effects of government policies and social preferences, this paper considers a three-echelon maritime supply chain with carbon abatement investment and low-carbon service investment (LCMSC). We focus on constructing a dynamic Stackelberg game model with heterogeneous expectations. Based on nonlinear dynamics theory, the dynamic evolution of the game and the influences of government policies, social preferences, and cost-sharing behaviors are investigated. The results indicate that: (1) Bifurcations and chaos caused by dynamic adjustment of the port and the shipping company will lead to the disorder of the pricing system and the effect of chaos on the development trend of expected profits and social welfare varies under different paths of the LCMSC system into chaos. (2) Government subsidies for carbon abatement technology not only significantly improve greenness and expected profits of all parties, but also improve the stability of the LCMSC system. The carbon emission quota for the port has nothing to do with LCMSC members' optimal strategy and the evolution of the LCMSC system's stability. However, it indirectly affects the decision strategy of multiple stakeholders through the variation of the carbon price. (3) Excessive fairness concerns and the port's risk-aversion awareness have negative impacts on greenness, social welfare and the system's stability, while high risk-aversion awareness of the shipping company and the forwarder play opposite roles. (4) The shipping company can promote a tripartite-wins situation for LCMSC and improve the stability of decision-making by appropriately sharing the carbon abatement cost of the port. This study expands the application scenario of nonlinear dynamics theory in the LCMSC. It also provides theoretical guides for the government to formulate policies to encourage the promotion of green shipping.
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