外部性
斯塔克伯格竞赛
比较静力学
投资(军事)
操作员(生物学)
微观经济学
经济
收入
业务
财务
生物化学
化学
抑制因子
政治
政治学
转录因子
法学
基因
作者
Bai Hao,Alain Bensoussan,Gordon Briest,Benoît Chevalier‐Roignant
出处
期刊:Operations Research
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2024-11-20
标识
DOI:10.1287/opre.2023.0075
摘要
Many cities struggle with financing their infrastructure projects. When decision makers cannot fully capture the benefits of their investments, there is a risk of underinvestment. Hong Kong’s transit operator created a model where it not only collects fare revenues but also engages in property management, leveraging the positive effects of public transport on nearby property values. In the article titled “Monetizing Positive Externalities to Mitigate the Infrastructure Underinvestment Problem,” the authors present a stochastic Stackelberg game of timing to examine the reasoning behind this approach. The issue is complex because the operator faces a two-dimensional optimal stopping problem that cannot be simplified by changing the numéraire. The authors determine the operator’s optimal investment strategy through the use of a “penalized problem” and provide comparative statics. They also identify the conditions in which capitalizing on positive externalities can encourage infrastructure investment. Other management challenges share similar structures.
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