中国
端口(电路理论)
业务
自治
网关(网页)
财务
经济
政治学
经济
工程类
计算机科学
电气工程
万维网
法学
作者
Francis E. Hutchinson,Tham Siew Yean
出处
期刊:Asian Affairs
[Informa]
日期:2021-05-27
卷期号:52 (3): 688-721
被引量:6
标识
DOI:10.1080/03068374.2021.1957305
摘要
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been characterised as a large-scale initiative to boost the movement of goods and services, capital, and people from China to Southeast Asia and beyond. Transport and logistics are a key aspect of this enterprise, with many projects focussing on railways, road networks, and ports receiving priority attention. However, BRI-related initiatives are often cast in unitary terms, with agency and autonomy almost uniquely ascribed to China-based firms and funders, and very little attributed to host country agents or their interests. Since 2013, Malaysia has received substantial inflows of BRI-related funds for infrastructure, particularly railways and ports. The Kuantan Port Expansion on Peninsular Malaysia's East Coast and the Melaka Gateway on its West Coast are two port-centred development projects associated with the BRI. Begun at the same time, these initiatives are similarly structured, as joint ventures linking large China-based state-owned enterprises with local players. Despite their similarities, these two projects have followed vastly different trajectories. While the Kuantan Port Expansion is proceeding according to schedule, the Melaka Gateway lies mired in delays and controversy. Through comparing and contrasting these two projects, this article will explore how – despite China's financial and political influence – host country actors can and do oppose, subvert, and even veto infrastructure initiatives perceived as inimical to their interests.
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