斯塔克伯格竞赛
关税
利润(经济学)
供应链
闭环
频道(广播)
业务
碳纤维
环境经济学
计算机科学
产业组织
微观经济学
电信
经济
算法
营销
控制工程
复合数
国际贸易
工程类
作者
Jiayi Sun,Lu Yang,Tianlin Shao,Fengmin Yao
摘要
Under the background of low-carbon economy, cross-shareholding is introduced into the low-carbon closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, a centralized and three decentralized decision-making models with different channel power structures are constructed. The recovery, emission reduction, and pricing decisions of low-carbon CLSC are studied, and a two-part-tariff contract is proposed to coordinate the low-carbon CLSC. The results indicate that under three channel power structures, the improvement of the cross-shareholding ratio and consumers’ low-carbon awareness are beneficial to improve recovery rate, carbon emission reduction and increase market demand. Under Nash Game, the profit of low-carbon CLSC can reach the centralized level which means cross-shareholding can realize the coordination of low-carbon CLSC. Under Stackelberg Game, the enterprise with larger channel power can always obtain higher profit. Cross-shareholding cannot coordinate the retailer-led low-carbon CLSC, however it can realize the partial coordination of the manufacturer-led low-carbon CLSC. Two-part-tariff contract can realize the coordination of low-carbon CLSC under both situations.
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