Ally, deterrence, or leverage in the tripartite game? The effects of indirect stakeholders in historic urban regeneration

The conflict between public and private interests has become a focal point of contention among various parties in the process of expropriation and relocation for historic urban regeneration. Failures to properly resolve such conflict often lead to impeded urban regeneration and/or loss of cultural values. Although previous studies have analyzed the mediating role of various types of indirect stakeholders in historic urban regeneration, they have not further examined various effects of indirect stakeholders. Inspired by the theories of dependence, deterrence, and agency among stakeholders, this study explains the different effects of indirect stakeholders on the three parties (government, developers, and residents) following the evolutionary game theory. Specifically, replicator dynamics equations are established to simulate the evolution paths of the government, developers, and residents in the tripartite game involving indirect stakeholders through a case study for the historic regeneration of Zhongshan Road in Nanning, China. Modeling parameters are obtained through semi-structured interviews and quantified analyses of policy documents. The results reveal that indirect stakeholders (1) show a positive ally effect benefiting the stability of government strategies, (2) have a negative deterrent effect conducive to the stable evolution of developers, and (3) have an indirect leverage effect on the evolution of residents. Our study makes contributions by (1) designing a new indirect stakeholder mechanism to urban regeneration, and (2) establishing a new analysis framework for the tripartite game in urban regeneration. Although the case study is conducted in the context of China, the analytical framework is applicable to other countries.