A Virtuous Way of Doing Philosophy: The Moderation of Curiosity and Hume’s Philosophical Method in A Treatise of Human Nature

Abstract: In A Treatise of Human Nature , Hume proposes a new philosophical method. This method results from integrating an empirically founded skepticism with an innovative study of the epistemic role of emotions. This combination of skepticism, empiricism, and moral psychology aims to establish a virtuous way of doing philosophy based on the regulation of our epistemic emotions. In this paper, I present the operating principles of this virtuous way of doing philosophy. The paper has three parts. I firstly claim that four principles compose Hume’s philosophical methodology. I contend that the moderation of curiosity plays the central role among them. Secondly, I claim that that is the case because of the pernicious effects resulting when this passion becomes excessive and misplaced. Finally, I show the role of curiosity’s moderation in the Conclusion of Book 1 of the Treatise , to substantiate the claim that the crisis Hume there depicts illustrates his virtuous way of doing philosophy.