Heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma

Cooperation is ubiquitous, but our innate selfishness greatly challenge our motivation to cooperate since natural selection favors the fittest individuals in all the ecosystems. In addition, cooperation is costly, implementing it weighs down the individual wealth and the prosperity of human society. Therefore, how to deal with social dilemma has attracted numerous scholars’ attentions. Among previous researches, indirect reciprocity acts a crucial role in the promotion of cooperation. However, scholars focus more on the consistency and constancy of all the players’ reputation fluctuation, and ignore its potential features, the heterogeneity and dynamic of the reputation increment. In real world, such a scenario can reflect it, for example, a famous person and a notorious person have a totally distinct reputation variation even if they have coincident actions. Inspired by aforesaid particularity of reputation variation, a new mechanism, heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence is introduced, in which players who have more payoffs than the average of their neighbors’ would be more influential, and their actions would lead to a bigger scale of reputation fluctuation due to more attentions from others. Simulation results show that cooperation is facilitated effectively by our new mechanism, compared with traditional model with constant reputation variation.