自由裁量权
制度理论
业务
代理(哲学)
顺从(心理学)
制度逻辑
样品(材料)
面子(社会学概念)
复归
委托代理问题
制度变迁
股东
实证研究
组织理论
公共关系
法律与经济学
会计
经济
公司治理
公共行政
管理
社会学
政治学
法学
社会心理学
财务
心理学
基因
哲学
化学
认识论
生物化学
色谱法
表型
社会科学
人类学
标识
DOI:10.1177/01492063211057845
摘要
In the face of increasing pressure to comply with institutional norms, firm managers may retreat from previous commitments to comply once they realize the challenges involved. This study examines how firms respond to institutional pressures in a particular way called reversion, in which an organization's managers temporarily comply when there are no consequences but resist when it is in their interest to resist. By integrating institutional and agency theories, we model the reversion decision as a tension between institutional constituents and organizational managers. An empirical analysis of a sample of Japanese firms that scheduled annual shareholder meetings during the 2001 through 2014 period was performed. Our findings show that although organizations’ susceptibility to certain institutional pressures determines initial organizational compliance, managers whose interests diverge from those of the institutional constituents can revert their decisions, especially when they have discretion in decision making to protect their own interests. These findings highlight the temporary nature of organizational responses to institutional pressures and help us understand how organizational agency can limit institutional control over an organization's actions.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI