中国
公司治理
语言变化
遗产管理(遗嘱认证法)
奖学金
公共行政
控制(管理)
共产主义
忠诚
国家(计算机科学)
功率(物理)
政治学
业务
法学
经济
管理
财务
政治
艺术
文学类
物理
量子力学
计算机科学
算法
作者
Christopher D. Carothers,Zhu Zhang
标识
DOI:10.1080/10670564.2022.2071885
摘要
Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party has dramatically expanded its use of inspections (巡视). Existing scholarship largely portrays inspections as an anti-corruption mechanism. However, based on an examination of hundreds of post-inspection reports from party organs, provincial and municipal governments, central state-owned enterprises, and other institutions, this article argues that while inspections initially focused on curbing corruption, in recent years the Xi administration has used them to advance a wide range of governance objectives. Besides curbing corruption, inspections also promote organizational management reforms, improve policy implementation, support party-building measures, and monitor loyalty to the party leadership. The article’s findings help resolve a puzzle about the Xi era: how does the Xi administration simultaneously pursue both power centralization and more effective governance?
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