业务
出租
生产(经济)
产能利用率
能力管理
产业组织
单位(环理论)
第三方
计算机科学
微观经济学
经济
法学
互联网隐私
数学教育
政治学
数学
计算机网络
作者
Wenbo Li,Bin Dan,Xumei Zhang,Yi Liu,Ronghua Sui
出处
期刊:Industrial Management and Data Systems
[Emerald (MCB UP)]
日期:2023-11-28
卷期号:124 (2): 583-611
被引量:2
标识
DOI:10.1108/imds-05-2023-0318
摘要
Purpose With the rapid development of the sharing economy in manufacturing industries, manufacturers and the equipment suppliers frequently share capacity through the third-party platform. This paper aims to study influences of manufacturers sharing capacity on the supplier and to analyze whether the supplier shares capacity as well as its influences. Design/methodology/approach This paper deals with conditions that the supplier and manufacturers share capacity through the third-party platform, and the third-party platform competes with the supplier in equipment sales. Considering the heterogeneity of the manufacturer's earning of unit capacity usage and the production efficiency of manufacturer's usage strategies, this paper constructs capacity sharing game models. Then, model equilibrium results under different sharing scenarios are compared. Findings The results show that when the production or maintenance cost is high, manufacturers sharing capacity simultaneously benefits the supplier, the third-party platform and manufacturers with high earnings of unit capacity usage. When both the rental efficiency and the production cost are low, or both the rental efficiency and the production cost are high, the supplier simultaneously sells equipment and shares capacity. The supplier only sells equipment in other cases. When both the rental efficiency and the production cost are low, the supplier’s sharing capacity realizes the win-win-win situation for the supplier, the third-party platform and manufacturers with moderate earnings of unit capacity usage. Originality/value This paper innovatively examines supplier's selling and sharing decisions considering manufacturers sharing capacity. It extends the research on capacity sharing and is important to supplier's operational decisions.
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